This submission highlights the key feminist inroad into the protection of refugee women fleeing persecution over the past twenty years-the moment in which Canadian state machinery formally engaged the fact that women may suffer social, political, or other forms of persecution because they are women. Drawing upon a myriad of sources, the submission illustrates the highly personal experiences that colour this engagement between feminism and the law, as well as the challenge of making women's experiences as women legally relevant and politically meaningful.
Introduction
In 1991, a Saudi Arabian woman known as ''Nada'' arrived at Mirabel Airport and told immigration officers that she was claiming protection as a refugee on the basis of having been persecuted, in part, for her ''feminist beliefs.'' The officers are reported to have responded with laughter.
1 Nada did not fare much better in her refugee hearing: her claim was rejected through a set of reasons that bear a distinctly patronizing tone. women sometimes suffer political, religious, or other forms of persecution because they are women. There is also a brief assessment of some issues that arose thereafter. The defining moment under consideration revolves around Nada's claim as well as Canada's introduction of guidelines for assessing gender-based refugee claims. As with many other feminist victories, the inroads were and are partial and there is much room for critique. However, there is also some cause for celebration, and such moments should never be passed by.
Enumeration of Grounds of Persecution under the Refugee Convention
Some of the difficulties which were experienced by Nada and other female refugee claimants are grounded in the language and history of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention).
6 This international legal instrument sets minimal terms for who is a refugee and requires signatory states to not return refugees to their persecuting state of nationality. As a signatory, Canada's domestic law must comply with the terms of this instrument. The Refugee Convention sets out specific criteria, which, if present, result in state recognition that a person is a refugee. One criteria requires claimants to demonstrate a ''well-founded fear of being persecuted'' for the enumerated grounds noted above, of ''race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion. '' 7 The Refugee Convention makes no specific reference to sex or gender in this enumeration, which is not surprising, especially given that it was drafted in the early years of the Cold War, shortly after the end of the Second World War.
The Refugee Convention was a collaborative product, created by the then members of the United Nations. Their negotiation process resulted in a document that reflected Western, largely American, conceptions of civil liberties. Its enumerated grounds that speak to liberal notions of individual political freedoms. 8 As a result, where one person faces death due to famine or drought, or civil war, and a second faces death due to political activism, only the second can hope to avail him or herself of protection through claiming refugee status. The first has no such recourse. The enumerated grounds are considered by some to mirror an ideological 6 goal to discredit the Soviet Bloc by embracing its political dissidents (who were known to be persecuted on enumerated civil and political grounds). 9 The issue of state-sanctioned gender oppression of women was simply not brought to the table.
The fact that the enumerated grounds were (and are) a poor optic for assessing the forms through which many women experience persecution has not gone unnoticed. Since at least 1985, the UNHCR has pressed Refugee Convention signatories to recognize that women may experience gender-related persecution, which can be linked with an enumerated ground to form the basis of a refugee claim. 10 Notably, in 1991, the UNHCR released guidelines proposing an interpretation of the Refugee Convention, which would embrace issues of gender-based persecution. Signatory states were encouraged to adopt similar guidelines or incorporate them into domestic law. It was in the same year, 1991, that Nada brought forward her claim of persecution.
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Not a ''Normal'' Case of Persecution Nada told the hearing officers that she had a well-founded fear of persecution for several reasons, including ''her religion (non-practising Shi-ite), political opinions (feminist) and membership in a particular social group (lay women).'' 12 Nada was a self-professed ''revolutionary'' and so refused to obey the general law that requires Muslim women in Saudi Arabia to wear a veil in public. As a result, she was targeted by the Committee for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, which is responsible for enforcing laws pertaining to clothing worn in public.
The two-member tribunal who assessed Nada's claim concluded that she was not a refugee. The tone of the tribunal's reasons suggests disapproval of Nada's behaviour and chastisement for her refusal to conform to the practices to which other women submit. Nada had explained that she only wore the veil to go to work and to avoid upsetting her father. The tribunal wrote:
Like all Saudi Arabian women, the claimant would have to obey the laws of general application that she denounces, in all circumstances and not only, as she did . . . to accommodate the feelings of her father who . . . was opposed to the liberalism of his daughter.
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What accounts for this paternalistic tone? Insight into the difficulty that Nada faced in having her claim taken seriously can be gleaned through a comment by Justin de Beauchamp, a spokesperson for the minister of immigration at the time of Nada's hearing. He said the following in defence of the panel who rejected Nada's claim:
She brought up an issue that quite frankly I don't think we'd ever faced . . . She defined it [the persecution] in terms of her feminist beliefs. The normal cases of persecution involve physical abuse of a horrible sort in which religion is involved and politics are involved . . . I guess it was very difficult for the members who heard the case to believe that the case she was making was credible.
14 These comments offer considerable insight. Feminist beliefs were not ''normally'' a question of politics or political opinion. Nada's claim that a woman could experience gender-specific laws as persecution was unbelievable-the character of the claim itself lacked ''credibility.'' In other words, the issue was not whether Nada was believed, but rather that what she claimed could not even be accepted as legitimate. The comments of both the panel, and then the ministry, implicitly supported the reasonableness of assigning so-called ''feminist beliefs'' to a private sphere, one that is outside the optic of ''true'' political opinion and thus outside the scope of protection offered to refugees. They reveal a common-sense trivialization of Nada's experiences.
Not all Canadians accepted the validity of this analysis. Strongly worded articles appeared in Canadian newspapers, criticizing the decision to force Nada to return to Saudi Arabia. One journalist described a number of decisions, including Nada's case, as being forms of persecution, asserting that ''ignorance and racist misogyny . . . prevail in those hearing rooms. '' 15 As well as accusing Canada of violating international treaties on human rights and women's rights, the journalist characterized these decisions as revealing ''cold and unconcealed contempt'' for women fleeing gender-based persecution.
Following her negative determination, Nada was ordered to be deported. She defied this order and went into hiding in Montreal, where she remained for twenty-one months. A warrant was issued for her arrest.
16 Nada's case caught the attention not only of Canadian groups, such as the Canadian Council for Refugees, but also of an international audience. Letters protesting the negative refugee determination were generated by a number of groups, including the Women Lawyer's Association of South Africa, the Federation for Women and Planned Parenthood in Poland, the Bar Association for the City of New York, and Equality Now (a New Yorkbased women's rights group with an international focus).
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Condemnation from domestic and international communities resulted in Canada announcing a decision on 29 January 1993 to permit Nada to remain in Canada. The then minister of immigration Bernard Valcourt stated that the decision was ''responding particularly to . . . concerns on Canada's international standing on human rights issues. '' 18 Importantly, Minister Valcourt exercised his discretion to permit Nada to remain on ''humanitarian and compassionate grounds'' rather than on the basis of the negative refugee determination having been wrong in law. This decision was left to stand.
The announcement came as something of a surprise, given that Minister Valcourt had clearly stated his opposition to ''sex-based'' refugee claims and had already refused to intervene in Nada's case. 19 The immigration minister had justified his position on two grounds. First, accepting women who were persecuted on the basis of gender would result in ''tens of millions of refugees'' flooding into Canada. 20 On a practical level, given that women refugees are generally not able to reach Canada in the first place, 21 this ''concern'' was not legitimate. Nada herself noted that her success in being On a principled basis, the minister's concern was irrelevant since Canada was, indeed, committed to not returning refugees to persecution. Either ''gendered persecution'' is persecution or it is not-numbers are irrelevant to this analysis.
The minister's second reason for inaction was that to accept such claims would be to impose Canadian values on other countries, in other words, a form of cultural imperialism. Audrey Macklin, in commenting on this case, engaged the question of cultural imperialism/cultural relativism directly. 23 She observed that as refugee determinations typically have limited effect on the refugee's home nation there is no ''imposition'' of cultural imperialism. In addition, the subjective component of the refugee test focuses the analysis on the individual's personal perception of persecution and not on whether a culture has inherently persecutory practices. This concern also revealed an ideological barrier regarding the meaning of acknowledging that a person qualifies for refugee protection. The Refugee Convention is framed around the notion that in many instances it is legitimate for states to provide a home to another state's citizens, where those foreign citizens experience the practices (or apathy) of their home state as persecutory. The refugee decision-making process requires Canada to assess foreign law, policy, and practices and decide whether another state permits persecution to take place (either directly or indirectly). By agreeing that asylum may be granted to those who are persecuted for their race or religion, Canada is already expressing and endorsing its values. These values, as grounds for which our state will in principle always grant protection to non-citizens, have legitimacy for Canadians-across cultural and political boundaries and differencesbecause we construe them as basic human rights. 24 Given these reasons, the ministry's resistance to formally recognizing gendered persecution became even more problematic. There is necessarily a suggestion that women's rights are not quite basic human rights and that protecting people subject to gender-based rights violations represents a less legitimate value than protecting those who are subject to, for example, race-based rights violations. The minister's decision to grant Nada protection was made public along with an announcement that the chair of the Immigration and Refugee Board was in the process of developing guidelines for dealing with gender-related refugee claims and that these guidelines would be released shortly. 25 Apparently, the chair had been working on these guidelines for some time. The simultaneous announcement of these developments is clearly not coincidental.
Gender Guidelines
The gender guidelines were first issued in early March of 1993 and then updated in 1996. 26 They were intended to guide decision-makers that were hearing claims on Canadian soil. If an Immigration and Refugee Board member made a decision that was at odds with the guidelines, the member was expected to explain this variance. The guidelines address four key issues: how to determine whether there is a link between gender, the feared persecution, and an enumerated ground; how to assess the feared harm; evidentiary issues that may come up in a gender-based claim; and special difficulties that may arise in the context of a hearing.
Although the guidelines directly assert that ''gender-based persecution is a form of persecution which can and should be assessed by the Refugee Division,'' they clearly indicate that persecution on the basis of gender alone is not enough. One must link the gendered persecution with an enumerated ground. On the one hand, this is a far cry from making gender an enumerated ground, or defining ''social group'' as expressly including ''women.'' On the other hand, the decision-maker is directed to assess the claim of persecution from an optic that recognizes that women may experience forms of persecution that are different from those more commonly experienced by men. As a result, the guidelines are a vehicle for generating awareness and sensitivity to a less ''male-centred'' concept of persecution. This symbolic expansion of the definition of refugee could have interesting consequences. Deborah Anker argues that ''bars to women's eligibility for refugee status lie not in the legal categories per se . . . but in the incomplete and gendered interpretation of refugee law.'' 27 As a result, she takes the position that the most good will be done for women through the reconceptualization of the existing enumerated grounds as inherently encompassing gendered persecution (as opposed to adding a sixth enumerated ground) and that instruments such as guidelines facilitate such reconceptualizations. I return to Anker's position later in this article. The guidelines describe three broad categories of situations where gender may be relevant for finding persecution. 28 The first category encompasses situations where women are persecuted because of the status, activities, or views of their spouses or other family members. In these situations, the women may have the views of family members imputed to them or else they may be persecuted as a method to pressure them into revealing information about family members' activities. The second category refers to circumstances of ''severe discrimination on grounds of gender, or acts of violence'' 29 where the state cannot or does not provide adequate protection. If such discrimination, or violence, is present and it is imposed on the basis of an enumerated ground, then the situation may qualify as persecution for the purposes of refugee determination. The final category refers to ''persecution as the consequence of failing to conform to, or for transgressing, certain gender-discriminating religious or customary laws and practices. '' 30 The definition hints at how such persecution can be linked to an enumerated ground: ''Such laws and practices, by singling out women and placing them in a more vulnerable position than men, may create conditions for the existence of a gender-defined social group.'' 31 A key feminist achievement in the guidelines is perhaps its instructions on evidentiary matters and the receipt of testimony from women who claim to have experienced gender-related persecution. The guidelines instruct board members to query, on an objective basis, whether it was unreasonable for the claimant to seek state protection in light of the claimant's social, cultural, religious, and economic context. Sensitivity is directed at what the social consequences for the claimant would have been had she made her plight known to authorities and thus to the public (for example, the need to consider whether community ostracism would have resulted from the public's knowledge that the claimant had suffered rape). Similarly, when considering if the claimant had an internal flight alternative (IFA), and so could have remained safely within her home state, the decision-maker is to 28 . A fourth category is also described, in which a woman's gender is really quite irrelevant.
It refers to ''women who fear persecution on the same Convention grounds, and in similar circumstances, as men . consider how the claimant's gender could have affected the reasonableness of pursuing an IFA.
Three particular difficulties regarding credibility and testifying at determination hearings are also addressed in the guidelines: how issues of shame or dishonour may impinge on a woman's ability to give evidence; the fact that women may not be aware of the details behind their male family member's political or military activities; and how the testimony of women who have suffered sexual violence and/or domestic violence should be contextualized in terms of rape trauma syndrome or battered wife syndrome (BWS). 32 A related highlight of the guidelines is its explicit recognition that ''state failure to protect women from private violence constitutes persecution,'' 33 thus denying the validity of a public/private division between state and intimate acts of violence.
These guidelines were and are only guidelines and not law.
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As a consequence, they are not binding on decision-makers and cannot ''fetter'' the decision-making process. Nonetheless, their significance for women cannot be understated, both in Canada and in other signatory states. The introduction of the guidelines has had international consequences:
''Canada was the trail-blazer in developing an asylum process that takes proper account of gender-related persecution,'' says High Commissioner Ruud Lubbers. ''The Canadian Guidelines were the first of their kind, and led other countries to recognize the importance of devoting special attention to the protection of refugee women. '' 35 Many other states, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, New Zealand, and Australia, have followed Canada's lead. They have adopted guidelines, legislation, and/or a line of jurisprudence relating to refugee claims that are based upon gender-related persecution. Given the ministry's comments noted earlier, it is interesting that Nada's lawyer, Ms. Marie-Louise Cote, celebrated the guidelines on the specific issue 32. For example, women suffering rape trauma syndrome exhibit memory loss and distortion and difficulty in concentration (See Gender Guidelines, supra note 26 at note 30), and women suffering battered women syndrome (BWS) will often stay in the abusive relationship for an astonishingly long time (See Gender Guidelines, supra note 26 at note 31). 33. Macklin, supra note 8 at 233-3.
34. An excellent in-depth assessment of the details, strengths, and weaknesses of the guidelines was undertaken in Macklin, supra note 8. 
Do the Guidelines Guide? A Brief Foray into What Happened Next
Nada received protection, albeit not as a refugee. Yet what about the women who made claims after the introduction of the guidelines? Were their claims of gender-based persecution fairly adjudicated? A central issue that was raised in Nada's case, and discussed in the guidelines, was the difficulty of linking gendered persecution to the five enumerated grounds of persecution. Chantal Tie has recently canvassed-and critiqued-extensively the consequences of the guidelines perpetuating the need to construct this linkage. 40 So, instead, I shall turn to a second issue that arose both in Nada's claim and the guidelines, namely the evaluation of gendered persecution when it occurs pursuant to a law of general application. 
Seeing through the Veils of Legitimacy: Laws of General Application
The reasons given in Nada's case refer to her being required, like other women, to obey ''laws of general application.'' This term has specific meaning in refugee law jurisprudence. Where a law does not ''single out'' people (perhaps by race or geographic area) but rather applies to all citizens, it is considered a law of general application. Such laws are given a presumption of validity and neutrality. A claimant who cites a general law as the source of their persecution must prove not only that the law is oppressive but also that the law is inherently persecutory in relation to a Refugee Convention ground. 41 The question has arisen as to how Muslim dress codes, which Nada had experienced as persecutory, ought to be approached under the guidelines. 42 This question was thoughtfully assessed in Namitabar v. Canada. 43 The Convention Refugee Determination Division (CRDD) had rejected Ms. Namitabar's claim, largely on the basis that the dress code was a law of general application. The appellate court found that the CRDD had made an error in law because it failed to recognize that laws of general application-such as a dress code-could be persecutory. Taking a critical perspective, the court stated that state persecution could cloak itself with a veneer of legality, thus creating ''an appearance of legitimacy. '' 44 The finding that the law was persecutory turned on the punishment for violating the dress code and the ''trial'' process. In Ms. Namitabar's state of nationality, Iran, failure to wear a chador is a criminal offence, which was at the time punishable by seventy-four lashes with a whip. The punishment can be imposed without appearing before a judge (since the crime is considered self-evident). 45 The court found the punishment so disproportionate, and so lacking in due process, as to constitute persecution, thus pressing past the veil of state-sanctioned legitimacy. The court linked the claimant's gender-based fear of persecution to ''political opinion,'' because ''in a country where the oppression of women is institutionalized any . . . act opposed to the imposition of a clothing code will be seen as a manifestation of opposition to the established theocratic regime. '' 46 Clearly influenced by the guidelines' interpretive principles, the court recognized that what may appear as an inconsequential act-a woman's decision about what to wear-may be categorized as a political statement that puts a women's safety at risk and that this political statement is of a character to trigger international protection obligations. 47 Despite such carefully worded precedents, members of the CRDD have been inconsistent when gender-based claims involving laws of general application are brought before them. Some have reproduced the patronizing tone and analysis that we saw in Nada's case, as is apparent in the following extract:
It is clear to this panel that the claimant had to cope . . . with what all women in Iran must cope with daily and that is petty and arbitrary harassment by a puritanical regime for such violations of their dress code as hair showing, painted fingernails, make-up and the like. The panel also notes that when the claimant was cautious she had no problems.
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. . . Nor does the panel find particular social group applicable for reasons of the claimant being a woman in Iran subject to a dress code. The dress code is an ordinary law of general application and does not violate a basic human right.
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This panel appears to have understood the act of disobeying the dress code as no more than a fashion statement and that the consequences of such disobedience are little more than ''petty harassment.'' The panel's insinuation that the claimant's case is diminished by the fact that all Iranian women are subject to harassment if they violate the dress code reveals either ignorance, misunderstanding, or disdain of the gender guidelines, which expressly instruct decision-makers that ''[a] gender-related claim cannot be rejected simply because the claimant comes from a country where women face generalized oppression and violence.'' 50 The panel's further comment-that the claimant was able to avoid ''problems'' by being ''cautious,'' would make 46 . Ibid. at para 23. 47. But see Tie, supra note 40, regarding the perverse reasoning that may arise when ''rooting out'' a political opinion, such as expecting women to be able to articulate their experiences as representative of feminist theories of oppression, as opposed to merely knowing that they suffer persecution because they are women. the claimant's problems the result of her own recklessness and not the result of objecting to practices that she experienced as oppressive. 51 It is analogous to suggesting that a claimant who is persecuted for speaking out against his or her state leader can avoid harassment by practising caution and avoiding letting others know of their opinions, and so is a refugee.
These two cases illustrate the fact that it is challenging for decisionmakers to learn how to approach gender-based persecution, especially when that persecution is sourced in laws of general application. ''Commonsense'' approaches to gendered experiences-that a women who adopts an appearance that is culturally, religiously, or socially ''inappropriate'' has willfully chosen to provoke harassment and so is somehow morally responsible for her situation-are deeply ingrained in Canadian society. The guidelines clearly make it more likely that such claimants will be taken seriously, but this will not always be the case. Given the inconsistent jurisprudence, one cannot predict with certainty whether Nada's claim would have turned out differently had it first been heard after the introduction of the guidelines.
Following Up: 2001 Statutory Frame
Although a high point in refugee law has been the introduction of the gender guidelines, they remain just that-non-binding guidelines. As ''soft law,'' gender-specific persecution is both legally and conceptually relegated to a secondary tier of protection. 52 The desire to send a message that not too much has changed was evidenced by a statement by the immigration minister's press secretary, just three days before the guidelines were released. He cautioned that the decision to grant Nada asylum ''was not a predecent-[sic]-setting case.'' 53 When Canada aggressively amended its immigration and refugee legislation in 1994, it had the opportunity to amend its legislation to include gender in the enumerated grounds. Canada failed to do so. This failure was attributed by some to a fear that such a move could upset relations with countries in which ''women have fewer rights.'' 54 There is also evidence of a backlash at play, and one can find rhetorical flourishes that have been presumably deployed to diminish the legitimacy of the guidelines, such as describing Nada and others in her situation as ''femigrants.'' 55 A similarly dismissive tone is certainly evident in a comment in the British weekly The Economist, in which it is stated that those who sought to turn the guidelines into law were ''radical women's groups. '' 56 By aligning this goal with radicalism, The Economist rhetorically marginalizes-and thus dismisses-its supporters, without needing to engage any substantive issues.
In 2001, Canada introduced new immigration and refugee legislation. It did not, however, change the definition of refugee to include ''gender'' in the enumerated grounds. Gender-related claims represent less than 2 per cent of all refugee claims that come before Canadian decision-makers. Although critics of the guidelines predicted a ''flood'' of claimants (presumably undeserving ones), such an increase has not occurred. In 2003, there were only 170 gender-based claims: 69 per cent of these claimants were recognized to be refugees. 57 There has been no noticeable increase in refugee claims brought forward by women since the guidelines came into play, giving credence to Nahla Valiji's accusation that the guidelines ''have had nominal impact beyond the symbolic expansion of the definition of refugee'' 58 -a result that may in part reflect the twinned facts that the guidelines do not apply outside of Canada and that Canada is effectively inaccessible to women refugee claimants. Although Anker may be correct, that the best world is one in which Canadians have simply incorporated gender sensitively into their understanding of persecution, such a world requires an extended timeline to develop, or it may never take hold. Women facing gender-based persecution simply may not have the luxury of waiting for Anker's world to come into being.
I was unable to locate any information about what has happened in Nada's life over the past fifteen years. The paper trail ends in a distinctly uncomfortable fashion, with suggestions that Nada's case had public currency not only because she was a woman fleeing gender-persecution but also because her circumstance played into anti-Arab and anti-Islamic prejudice. 59 In reviewing newspaper articles from the time when Nada's status was at issue, I was struck by descriptions that characterized the laws of Saudi Arabia as ''medieval'' 60 and, later, by assertions that Nada's case stood for the proposition that ''there are countries [that is, Saudi Arabia] in which women are subjugated.'' 61 These statements resonate with Joanna Erdman and Andrea Sanche's observation that there is a certain level of comfort in ''refugee-receiving'' countries if the gendered practice in question can be identified as an alien one, which is associated with ''distasteful'' '' 'foreign' cultural practice[s]'' that define them and not us. 62 I am led to contrast the above descriptions, and their assumptions about gender and cultural or religious difference, with a comment that Nada made in an interview following the decision to grant her leave to stay in Canada. Nada described what she had thought and felt when her claim for refugee protection was met with laughter by the Canadian immigration officers at Mirabel Airport: ''I realized then,'' Nada says, ''that women's repression had less to do with Islam than with men's power.'' 63 One of the dangers of Canada's failure to move beyond the guidelines and adopt gender as a specific enumerated ground is that it requires the decision-maker to turn the optic away from the question of whether a woman suffers persecution because she is a woman and towards another ground, such as race, religion, or political opinion. It thus only delegitimates those gendered persecutory practices that are somehow a product of racial, religious, or political suppression and not those based in plain old sexism. However, in conclusion, there are still bright moments that are worth recalling. Shortly after the guidelines came into effect, a panel made the following statement in a case regarding gender-based persecution: '' 'Feminists' are 'a particular social group' under the Convention, because they voluntarily associate for an important and fundamental purpose-that is, to promote the rights of women.'' 64 
